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RELIEF IN FEDERAL COURTS AGAINST STATE JUDGMENTS
OBTAINED BY FRAUD*
WHiLE equitable considerations would favor relief to the litigant against
whom a judgment has been fraudulently obtained in a state tribunal,' the
grant of a remedy by a federal court raises the problems of (1) the applicabil-
ity of state requirements governing impeachment of judgments for fraud,
and (2) the extent to which previous state decisions on the point of fraud
between the same parties should control. These issues confronted the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of Griffith v. Banh of
New York. 2 In the court below, the complaint alleged that the defendant
* Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
1. The administration of justice brings into conflict the social objective of azuring a
conclusive determination of litigious claims-such as vill bring stability and certainty to
legal situations-with the equitable imperative that fairness prevail in the judicial combat,
implying relief from judgments obtained by fraud. In most jurisdictions, a compromiza
appears to have been worked out on the basis of avoiding rdeitigation of the isSue3 that were
once before a competent court, while at the same time allowing the unsucce:zful puty to
bring an independent action upon the facts which his opponent's fraud prevented him from
exposing (as where the defrauded litigant has been kept away from court by a fake promice
of compromise, or his attorney connives at his defeat). Cf. United States v. Throchmorton,
98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878).
2. 147 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
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bank, as administrator of a testamentary trust, had compelled the bene-
ficiary, under threat of withholding the funds, to submit to a consent decree
from the Supreme Court of New York County which distributed the estate
and discharged the trustee from all liability. Subsequently the beneficiary
petitioned the Surrogate's Court for a compulsory accounting, alleging that
the bank's "duress" had prevented her from contesting the administration
accounts. Upon the Surrogate's granting of a motion on the pleadings to
dismiss, on the ground that the New York Supreme Court judgment was
conclusive and could not be collaterally attacked, the present action3 for
money damages was instituted in the federal forum. The district court dis-
missed for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
3. While cases of attack upon state judgments in federal courts generally take the
form of independent bills in equity, either brought before it, as in Simon v. Southern Ry.,
236 U. S. 115 (1915), and Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 (1920), or removed from
a state court (a) for reasons of diversity of citizenship, Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589
(1891), or (b) on a federal question, American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932),
the present case was presented as an action at law, based on a tort claim. Since there could
be no recovery of damages unless the previous judgment was found to have been in fact
fraudulently obtained, the case is clearly one of collateral attack. The antinomy of "legal"
form (claim for damages) and "equitable" nature (relief against fraud) here involved
brings out the difference between those attempts to avoid the effects of a judgment by
means of an action at law [e.g., the ejectment suit in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877),
the action of partition in the Illinois adoption case, Keal v. Rhydderck, 317 111. 231, 148
N. E. 53 (1925) ] which are generally based upon strictly legal grounds: lack of jurisdiction
of the court, nullity of the proceedings for want of service or defect in the constitution of the
court [RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 11, comment b; VANFLEET, THE LAW OF COL-
LATERAL ATTAcx (1892) 5], and the proceedings to enjoin enforcement of a state judgment
obtained by fraud, which are founded upon the inequitableness of allowing the guilty party
to take advantage thereof, so that the merits of the case-irrelevant in a typical collateral
attack-have a controlling influence in the adjudication. The apparent incongruity of the
situation outlined above should not create substantial difficulty. The equity jurisdiction
of the federal courts [Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11; 28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1940); see Atlas Life
Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern Inc., 306 U. S. 563 (1939), and cases cited] could be exercised to
dispose of incidental issues at law [Equity Rule 23, 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 app. (1941); 28
U. S. C. § 398 (1940) 1 once the court had acquired jurisdiction for any purpose, Camp v.
Boyd, 229 U. S. 530 (1913), McGowan v. Parish, 237 U. S. 285 (1915), Greene v. Louisville
& Interurban R. R., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), Rice & Adams v. Lathrop, 278 U. S. 509 (1929).
See CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TORTs (1924) 258-63 for a review of
English and American statutes authorizing specific and substitutional redress in the same
proceeding and cases collected, id. at 246-80. The new FED. RULES Or CIV. Proc., 28
U. S. C. following § 723c (1940), Rules I and 2, broaden the traditional doctrine, and under
Rule 54(c) ". . . every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his plead-
ings." Cohen v. Randall, 137 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cerl. denied, 320 U. S. 796
(1943); United States for the use of Susi Contracting Co. Inc. v. Zara Contracting Co. Inc.,
146 F. (2d) 606 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). Therefore, the particular theory upon which the com-
plaint may be drawn does not constrain the court; it is enough that the facts entitle the
plaintiff to some form of relief. Atwater v. North American Coal Corp., 36 F. Supp. 975
(S. D. N. Y. 1940); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 38 F. Supp,
520 (N. D. Ohio 1941); Kansas City St. L. & C. R. R. v. Alton R. R., 124 F. (2d) 780
(C. C. A. 7th, 1941); Truth Seeker Co. Inc. v. Durning, 147 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
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granted, but the circuit court of appeals reversed. Characterizing the re-
view of judgments for fraud as procedural, and hence outside the scope of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,4 it held that the district court had jurisdiction to
entertain a collateral attack upon a state judgment.5
4. 304U. S.64(1938).
5. If the attack upon the first s ate court judgment had been carried directly to the
federal forum, it could be entertained on the grounds of fraud as long as the following condi-
tions were present:
(1) The jurisdictional requirements of diversity and amount were met.
(2) The action was not founded upon procedural defects of the previous judgment,
over which the original court e-xercises supervisory powers, Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80,
85 (1878) (holding that the decision as to whether the vice of the judgment is one of pro-
cedural form or of fraud is one for the federal courts to make, and that they are always
competent to examine the nature of the defect in order to cettle the is-ue of their jurizdic-
tion ratione materia).
(3) The circumstances of the state judgment are such that its enforcement v;ould b2
contrary to the standards of equity and good conscience. Federal courts vill then interposZ
to prevent the party who has been guilty of fraud from getting the benefit of his action.
Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640 (1884). The theory of the equitable remedy provided by
federal courts is that in granting injunctions against the enforcement of state judgments
they are not discussing their formal validity nor interfering with state courts and their
officials in any way, but merely acting upon one of the parties to arrest any meazures he may
take under the judgment to secure the advantages thereof. If this rationalization is propar,
the "no-injunction" rule, 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1940), which rcceivd a
strict interpretation in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 113 (1941), Note (19-2)
52 YALE L. J. 130; see I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (Supp. 1942) 304-13, :ould ctill not
apply when the object of the injunction is no longer a "proceeding in a state court" but a
judgment tainted vith fraud. Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115 (1915); Wells Fargo &
Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 (1920). Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not seem to dizcard this
argument entirely, but rather to leave the issue in suspense. See the Torxcy case, 314 U. S.
at 136. For possible effect of Toucey decision on the administration of equitable remedies by
federal courts against state judgments fraudulently obtained see 1 MCoon, FEDERAL. PrAc-
TIcE (Supp. 1942) 351-2, distinguishing that situation (where no further remedy is available)
from the "relitigation" basis of the Toucey case (where the holder of a federal judgment al-
ways has the chance of pleading it as res judicata in the state court, vith the further p*:Zi-
bility, if the plea is disregarded, of getting review by certiorari in the Supreme Court on the
grounds of denial of full faith and credit).
(4) No adequate remedy at law is available in state courts, Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S.
485 (1883) (Louisiana action in revendication available at law). Suits in equity for the
cancellation of insurance policies on the grounds of fraud serve to illustrate this require-
ment. The bills in equity were dismissed in Insurance Company v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616
(U. S. 1871); Cable v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 283 (1903); Enelow v. New Yorh Life
Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 (1935); the remedy was granted in American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,
300 U. S. 203 (1937). The want of remedy exists regardless of the recours2 that may be opan
in the state court in equity. Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. S6 (1389). The state remedy
need not have been exhausted when it appears that the claim for relief is prompted by the
state court's refusal to declare itself incompetent in the original suit. Atchison, Top.-Ia &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924). The test of the adequacy of the legal remedy is
that afforded by federal rather than by state courts. Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ino.
Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64 (1935); Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 2S0 (1940). For the instant caze, no
remedy at law was specifically provided under New York law. Section 43(5) of the Civil
Practice Act merely established a six-year statute of limitations for fraud (tort) actions. To
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To reach this result the circuit court of appeals had first to overcome
whatever conclusiveness the Surrogate's disposition of the case might have
as against a subsequent attempt to impeach the original judgment.0 The
court stressed the fact that the import of the Surrogate's dismissal was not
clear, for although his opinion said that, since one of two concurrent courts
had exercised jurisdiction in the premises7 and the parties had submitted
to the proceedings through final judgment, they were bound, he continued:
"If fraud or newly discovered evidence or other grounds for the vacatur
of that judgment is claimed, the attack upon it must be made by a direct
application to the Supreme Court." s In the circuit court of appeals' view,
it was not possible to interpret this decision beyond saying that it did not go
to the merits of the case.' Applying the rule that a dismissal not on the
merits concludes only the question actually decided by the holding,1" the
court held that the parties could renew their action in another tribunal',
without being bound as to any facts which were or could have been deter-
mined by the previous judgment.
that extent, the federal court could be justified in saying that remedy was lacking (147 F.
(2d) 899, 904). But the cases cited in connection with this point indicate that through a
broad interpretation of the provisions of the New York Civil Practice Act, § 528, concerning
the motion to set aside a judgment for error of fact not arising on the trial, it is possible to
obtain review of a judgment obtained by fraud beyond the two-year limitation of that
section. Section 528 is derived from Sections 1290 and 1291 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which were held not to bar review in cases of fraud. Furman v. Furman, 153 N. Y. 309, 47
N. E. 577 (1897), People v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 60 Misc. 150, 113 N. Y. Supp. 70
(Sup. Ct. 1908). Cf. Eichner v. Metropolitan Street Ry., 114 App. Div. 247, 99 N. Y. Supp.
870 (1st Dep't 1906); Matter of William Tilden, 98 N. Y. 434 (1885). Under Section 528,
review has been granted, on the ground of fraud, after the expiration of the two-year period.
Gysin v. Gysin, 263 N. Y. 509, 189 N. E. 568 (1934); Matter of Humpfner, 166 Misc. 672,
3 N.Y. S. (2d) 143 (Surf. Ct. 1938).
6. See 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 2896-7.
7. The Supreme Court of New York County and the Surrogate's Court in this case.
The Surrogate cites Matter of Runk, 200 N. Y. 447 (1911); Colson v. Pelgram, 259 N. Y.
370 (1932); Matter of Malloy, 278 N. Y. 429 (1938), in support of his concurrent jurisdiction
over trustee's accounts.
8. Estate of Anna R. Morison, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 26, 1943, p. 1087, col. 7.
9. Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) 899,903 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
10. Converse v. Sickles, 146 N.Y. 200,40 N. E. 777 (1895); Genet v. President, etc., of
Delaware and Hudson Canal, 163 N. Y. 173, 57 N. E. 297 (1900); 170 N. Y. 278, 63 N. E.
828 (1902); Ruddv. Cornell, 171 N. Y. 114,63 N. E. 823 (1902); Clark v. Scoville, 198 N. Y.
279, 91 N. E. 800 (1910); Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. Lurie Woolen Co. Inc., 232 N. Y. 112, 133
N. E. 370 (1921); Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N. Y. 166, 170 N. E. 532 (1930);
Bliss v. Omnibus Corp., 169 Misc. 662, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 979 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Brick v. Cohn-
Hall-Marx Co., 283 N. Y. 99, 27 N. E. (2d) 518 (1940). See 2 FREEMAN, JUDGAENTS (5th
ed. 1925) 1546. See also Shaw v. Broadbent, 129 N. Y. 114, 29 N. E. 238 (1891); Rose v.
Hawley, 141 N. Y. 366, 36 N. E. 337 (1894). Fogarty v. O'Reilly, 56 Misc. 192, 107 N. Y.
Supp. 234 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (dismissal of complaint for insufficiency); Thorburn v. Gates, 103
Misc. 292, 171 N. Y. Supp. 198 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (dismissal for want of jurisdiction), cf.
Bradner v. Howard, 75 N. Y. 417 (1878); In re Lesser's Will, 159 Misc. 598, 288 N. Y. Supp.
598 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
11. RESTATE MENT JU.DGMENTS (1942) § 49.
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Under New York law, a court other than the original one may not enter-
tain an attack upon a judgment unless the fraud alleged is "extrinsic." 12
Thus, a decision by the Surrogate that there had been "extrinsic" fraud
would have given him jurisdiction over the independent action; but, if the
fraud had been "intrinsic," the injured party would have had to seek relief
in the original court.13 Upon examination of the facts alleged in the com-
plaint, and accepting them as true for the purposes of decision upon the
motion to dismiss, the Surrogate would seem to have characterized the
fraud as "intrinsic," and therefore ordered the motion granted.1 4 Such a
12. The Surrogate's opinion contains the statement that "... . If fraud or newly dia-
covered evidence or other grounds for the vacating of that judgment is claimed, the attack
upon it must be made by a direct application to the Supreme [original] Court. [CrouT2 v.
McVickar, 207 N. Y. 213 (1912) ]." Estate of Anna R. Morison, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 26, 1943,
p. 108, col. 1. The circuit court of appeals says that this "... . seems to be going beyond
the ancient distinction between forms of fraud." Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d)
899, 903 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). The criticism appears justified by the trend of New York
precedents. Crouse v. AMcVickar, 207 N. Y. 213, 100 N. E. 697 (1912), held not op21 to
collateral attack a judgment rendered in pursuance of a settlement, which the winning party
had obtained on the strength of the evidence he was to present at the trial, when his de-
frauded opponent discovered that the witnesses had been suborned to perjure thenzr-aves.
The court said that such intended perjury was equivalent to perjury at the trial, and that
the only remedy lay in the original action. (Id. at 219, 100 N. E. at 698.) The opinion cites
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (1878), in connection with the inadmifsibility of
an attack founded on perjured testimony, forged instrument or "any matter which was ac-
tually presented and considered in the judgment assailed." (rd. at 66.) It is apparent, as the
circuit court of appeals concludes, that Crouse v. .McVidcar merely restates the clasiical
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, holding that perjury, as a form of the latter,
is not a proper basis for an independent action to set aside the judgment. SubSequent Nev,
York cases cited in the Griffiils opinion [147 F. (2d) at 903] reaffirm the doctrine, and supp rt
the conclusion that on the point of extrinsic fraud, as a ground for impeachment, the New
York and the federal doctrine substantially coincide. Therefore, even if the Surrogate sav,
fit to deny his jurisdiction in the premises, the federal court might proceed without con-
tradicting New York law. But the indefiniteness of the Surrogate's opinion left doubt as to
whether he had characterized the fraud involved, and if so, how. If his dismissal meant that
the duress complained of belonged in the category of intrinsic fraud, this holding would b.
the latest adjudication of New York courts previous to the bringing of the present action,
and the question would then arise as to what authoritativeness the federal court should
recognize in it. See 147 F. (2d) at 902.
13. It could be argued that the false accounts involved in the administration of the
estate, on the strength of which the defendant bank had obtained a settlement through the
consent judgment, were a matter of intrinsic fraud.
14. As the Surrogate's decision was rendered upon a motion on the pleadings, it might
be approached from the point of view of a dismissal having to do with the formal sufficiency
of the complaint. The case would be analogous, in this respect, to any other dismisZal
founded on procedural defects apparent on the face of the pleadings, such as formal mis-
takes, misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, incapacity of the plaintiff, etc. Se RrsAxE-
3JENT, JUDncaENTS (1942) § 50, comments b, d; 2 FREMvuN, JtrcT;DI.sjrs (5th ed. 1925)
1561-2, 1567-8. A dismissal in these circumstances is not on the merits. Where the ab-znce
of sufficient jurisdictional allegations is grounds for a dismis-al for ,ant of jurisdiction, the
plaintiff is not precluded from renewing his action in the same court once the difficulty is
remedied. Smith v. McNeal, 109 U. S. 426 (1533); cf. Gould v. Evansville & Crawfordsille
R. R., 91 U. S. 526 (1875).
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judgment has not generally been deemed one on the merits 11 and has not
barred a new action in which the facts could be properly pleaded so as to
allow a full determination of the controversy." If, as in this case, however,
the plaintiff decided to carry his complaint with the same allegations of fact
to a different court, could it not be said that despite the limited conclu-
siveness of the previous dismissal, the second tribunal should hold the com-
plaint barred? The function of a dismissal not on the merits, to allow the
litigant to amend without prejudice, is no longer served when he simply
reiterates in another court a claim that has already been considered in-
sufficient.' 7 This argument, however, appears available only when both
courts are bound to apply the same rules as to the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. If it is otherwise, the interpretation of the same facts by a
second court in the light of different legal principles may lead to a contrary
result even though the complaints are identical. In the actual case, New
York decisions pointed to a strict distinction between "intrinsic" and
"extrinsic" fraud,' admitting only the latter as a basis for independent ac-
15. The conclusiveness of a judgment not on the merits extends only to the precise
point presented by the pleadings and decided by the ruling upon the motion or demurrer.
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Scharf Tag, Label & Box Co., 121 Fed. 313, 318 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903).
The limited extent of a dismissal not on the merits is to be ascertained from the ground upon
which it was granted. Mayor of Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U.S. 259 (1913); Swift v. McPher-
son, 232 U. S. 51 (1914).
16. In this connection, the function of a dismissal not dn the merits appears to be that of
preventing a case from reaching the trial stage when the pleadings fail to provide the neces-
sary elements for a valid adjudication of the claims and to safeguard the substantive rights
of the parties by relieving them from the consequences of a formal mistake which would
otherwise bar their presenting the cause of action in proper form. This result is achieved by
limiting the scope of conclusiveness to the actual holding, so that while the particular com-
plaint may be dismissed, nothing precludes the litigant from supplying in a new and amended
complaint the elements required for a proper trial of the cause on its merits.
17. The ample powers granted judges by modern rules of procedure in respect to au-
thorizing amendments in the pleadings should lead to a more infrequent use of dismissals
not on the merits. It is also to be expected that judges will not allow the litigant whom they
have already ordered out of court on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, to return time and
again with new allegations of facts purporting to establish it. The plaintiff cannot present
his case piecemeal. Just as a judgment on the merits precludes the parties from bringing up
in a new proceeding on the same cause of action all the facts concerned in the previous ad-
judication, which either were or could have been actually litigated, a dismissal on the plead-
ings for want of jurisdiction should be conclusive upon the issue, from the moment that the
litigant failed to show, when he first had a chance to, the elements with which to istablish
jurisdiction. Under this view, the Surrogate's dismissal would appear final to the extent of
excluding the litigants from his court. In federal courts, the finality of a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction is held to be equivalent to that of a decision in favor of jurisdiction, within
the scope of the Baldwin case, American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U, S. 156 (1932); the
jurisdictional facts remaining as they were, the plaintiff cannot again sue in the same court.
Ripperger v. A. C. Allyn & Co. Inc., 113 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). Otherwise, a dis-
missal for want of jurisdiction is not a bar to a new actiom Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 156
(U. S. 1840); Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1866); Sylvan Beach, Inc. v. Koch,
140 F. (2d) 852, 860 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944).
18. The fraud complained of is extrinsic when " . . the very duress by which the
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tion in a different tribunal,9 while federal courts have allowed such actions
when the fraud was merely "intrinsic." 11'3 The difference in legal standards
made the outcome of the case dependent upon a choice of the law which
should govern federal judicial relief against fraud.
The circuit court of appeals held that the federal courts are not bound
by state rules. 2' This view gains support from the fact that the right to see:
review of a judgment generally depends on whether the injured party had
the opportunity of bringing before the court in the original action the facts
and issues that constitute fraud. 22 If he had, the policy of avoiding relitiga-
tion would generally cause the review to be limited by the framework of the
original action and its ancillary proceedings,23 excluding any action before a
different tribunal; the latter would be appropriate only when the fraud itself
prevented the litigant from fairly presenting the facts in his favor to the
original court. Consequently, the classification of fraud resolves itself into a
determination of which court is the proper one for the case to be brought in,
and the dichotomy between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" fraud becomes a
device for effecting a distribution of the power of review over judgments.
This power, essential to the functioning of court systems, is allocated by
rules strictly procedural in nature. The category in which state courts may
place the particular case for the purpose of review should have no influence
release or consent is obtained also prevents the coerced party from challenging before or at
the trial the statements or conduct of its adversary. Thus in the original action the izue of
duress never is before the court. Indeed, the case differs little, if at all, from tho:,2 where a
vwitness is forcibly prevented from testifying, or an attorney is bribed to fight a loing battle
or give his client false advice." Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) 899, 902 (C. C. A.
2d, 1945). There is a large literature on the distinction betwe-cn intrinvie and e:trin-ic fraud.
See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL. Pn c'rxcE (1938) 326S; Notes (1927) 12 Comx. L. Q. 335, (1934) 23
CALIF. L. R v. 79, (1935) 49 H.-nv. L. REv. 327, (1942) 36 ILL. L. REv. 894.
19. See note 12 supra.
20. The doctrinal conflict of the Supreme Court in its leading cas.:s on the cubject,
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (187S). and Marzhall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589
(1891), is reviewed in (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 263, noting Chicago, R. I. &c P. Ry. v. Calli-
cote, 267 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920), cert. denied, Callicote v. Chicago, R. I. Cc P. Ry., 255
U. S. 570 (1921). Reference is made there to Graver v. Faurot, 76 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 7th,
1896), certif. dism'd, 162 U. S. 435 (1896), where an attempt to secure a decisioa from the
Supreme Court failed on technical grounds. In the meantime, federal courts have taken the
matter into their own hands; see Publicker v. Shallcross, 105 F. (2d) 9-49 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939),
ceri. denied, 308 U. S. 624 (1940) (involving perjury). And the Supreme Court z.ems to have
committed itself in the direction of eliminating the Tlhrodhmorlon doctrine by its dcenson in
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 233 (1944).
21. Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) S99,904 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
22. The requirement that the impeachment be limited to those izues which the party
injured by the fraud was prevented thereby from bringing before the original court has laen
criticized as excessively strict, inasmuch as it fails to take into account the actual impozibil.
ity to defend himself which the fraud may have brought upon a litigant, even where the
perjured vitness or the forged document vas before the court. 3 Moon, FEDERa. PMC-
TICE (1938) 3269.
23. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 65 (1878); Barrow v. Hunton, 99
U. S. SO (1878).
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outside the forum because it serves merely to characterize the fraud with
reference to the availability of state remedies in either the original tribunal
or another court; state criteria of procedural organization could not properly
settle the scope of federal powers.24 The review of judgments on grounds of
fraud may then be considered, under the authority of the present case, as a
procedural matter, exempted by the Erie doctrine from subordination to
state law.
2 5
The same result would obtain if, instead of being considered procedural,
the setting aside of a judgment on the grounds of fraud could be charac-
terized as an exercise of the federal court's equity jurisdiction,2 invoked
under a plaintiff's "equitable remedial right." To the determination of
24. Compare Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80 (1878); see 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
(1938) 210.
25. In exercising its independent judgment over such matters, there may be one limita-
tion for the federal court to observe: the conditions under which the substantive right to
seek review of a judgment must be exercised by the litigant. This requirement seems con-
sistent with the theory that the grant of relief against judgments is a procedural matter,
inasmuch as, quite apart from what court shall entertain the petition, there lies the question
of whether there is any fraud involved at all; the elements of fraud required before it be-
comes operative as ground for review, set the limits of the plaintiff's substantial right,
which he, under state law, carries the burden of proving in order to state a cause of action
when he comes into a federal court on diversity jurisdiction. The "full faith and credit"
clause, U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, § 1, has been interpreted as imposing upon federal courts an
obligation no greater than that to which courts of different states are subject among each
other. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877), Union & Planter's Bank v. City of Memphis,
111 Fed. 561 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901), 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 2797-8. The rule
being that a judgment given by a court which had jurisdiction both over the persons and the
subject matter is entitled to full faith and credit in another state (and consequently in a
federal court) unless obtained through fraud or collusion [see Ball v. Warrington, 108 Fed.
472 (C. C. A. 3d, 1901), American National Bank of Denver v. Supplee, 115 Fed. 657 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1902) 1, it could be said, by analogy, that a federal court will hold a state judgment
valid only to the extent that the courts of the same state where it was rendered will them-
selves uphold its finality. The threshold of validity would therefore be the set of least condi-
tions which state law requires for a review of the judgment. Thus, if the Surrogate in tile
instant case had adjudged himself competent and dismissed the petition on the grounds that
no fraud had been committed, his determination would be final as res judicata, and tile
federal court would not be able to find in that decision the "minimum amount" of fraud
required for setting aside the original judgment. With the federal court precluded from
overriding this finding, it is unlikely that either party would succeed in avoiding it by means
of a collateral attack on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the Surrogate's Court, because,
though this form of impeachment was originally accepted, Thompson v. Whitman, 18 alvl.
457 (U. S. 1873), Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877), see 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed.
1925) 2809-14, 2832-9, it has been strongly curtailed; a federal court must take as conclusive
the state court's determination of its jurisdiction over the subject matter, Forsyth v. Ham-
mond, 166 U. S. 506 (1897), as well as over the parties, American Surety Co. v. Baldwin,
287 U. S. 156 (1932), Note (1932) 42 YA.E L. J. 427, if the issue was made and open to
litigation in the original action. See also Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283
U. S. 522 (1931); Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371
(1940); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381,403 (1940); Comment (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 1235, 1245.
26. JudiciaryAct of 1789, § 11; 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940).
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such a right state law is said not to apply.27 The litigant who seeks redres
for fraud under these circumstances puts into operation the "general prin-
ciples, rules and usages of equity" 23 developed by the English Court of
Chancery up to the time of the Revolution,0 which uniformly guide federal
courts in the administration of their equitable remedies and proceedings."2
In enforcing these principles the federal courts will not allow a state statute
to impair their power; 31 nor will they give effect to an equitable remedy pro-
vided by a state statute.3 2 Though recently subordinated to state statutes of
limitations, 3 equitable remedial rights seem to retain an independence
27. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, known as the "Rules of Decision Act,"
applies, by its own terms, to trials at common law. Nevertheless, being considered declara-
tory of the law that would obtain even in the absence of a statute, Mason v. United States,
260 U. S. 545, 559 (1923), it ex'tends to suits in equity, and under that doctrine zubtantive
rights in equity established by state law will be enforced in federal courts. Pusey & Jones
Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923). While the interpretation of § 34 in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (193S), has brought diversity suits, both at law and in equity, under
state law, Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938), the field of equitable
remedial rights is said to remain outside the scope of the rule. Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York v. York, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464 (U. S. 1945), rev'g 143 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 19-14);
Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280 (1940). See 1 MOORE, FEDErAL Pp-%ccE (Supp. 19-4)
404 et seg.
28. Guffeyv.Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 114 (1915).
29. In United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 10, 115 (U.S. 1319) Chief Justice Marzhall
stresses the uniformity of equity doctrine throughout the federal judiciary.
30. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430 (U. S. 16), emphasizes the role of federal courts
as a parallel of the High Court of Chancery.
31. United Statesv. Howland, 4 Wheat. 103 (U.S. 1819).
32. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923); Kelleam v. Maryland Cas-
ualty Co., 312 U. S. 377, 382 (1941); see 1 MooRE, F.DERmAL Prxci-xE (1933) 210. The
attitude of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who spoke for the Court in both the Purscy & Jores and the
Erie cases, is discussed by Judge Frank in York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. (2d) 503, 524
(C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
33. Reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (opinion cited supra
note 32) the Supreme Court held, in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 65 Sup.
Ct. 1464 (U. S. 1945) that a diversity action cannot be entertained by a federal court under
the Erie v. Tomphins rule when such action is barred by the statute of limitations of the
state where the federal court is sitting. See Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280 (1940). In the
majority opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter reaffirms the philosophy of Erie v. Tornp~rs
upon the non-erdstence of a general federal law, saying that "in giving federal courts 'cc;-
nizance' of equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congrezs never gave nor did the
federal courts ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights created by ctate law, or to
create substantive rights denied by state law."
The opinion goes on to say that "this does not mean that whatever cqnitei~k rerrdcy is
available in a state court must be available in a diversity suit in a federal court, or con-
versely, that a federal court may not afford an equitable remedy not available in a State
court. Equitable relief in a federal court is of course subject to restrictions: the suit must ba
within the traditional scope of equity as historically evolved in the English Court of Chan-
cery . . . ; a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law must be i.anting . . . ; esplicit
Congressional curtailment of equity powers must be respected . .. ; the constitutional
right to trial by jury cannot be evaded. ... That a state may authorize its courts to give
equitable relief unhampered by all such restrictions cannot remove thee fetters from the
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which, projected against a background of long judicial tradition,34 affords a
broad base for the operation of a federal power of review over judgments
tainted with fraud.. If this theory were applied, it would be without reference
to requirements of state law for setting aside judgments, since the right to
seek review of a judgment-being considered "remedial" instead of "sub-
stantive"-would not be subject to any limitation flowing from the rule of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
Whatever the relative merits of the applicable rationales, the result ob-
tained by the circuit court of appeals seems appropriate. The independence
claimed for federal courts' dealing with fraud in state judgments, is quali-
fied in the opinion 15 by an assertion of discretionary powers over petitions
for equitable relief.36 In the exercise of such discretion, a federal district
federal courts .... State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court must give
simply because a federal court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal
to the State's courts. Contrariwise, a federal court may afford an equitable remedy for a sub-
stantive right recognized by a State even though a State court cannot give it . . .the body of
adjudications concerning equitable relief in diversity cases leaves no doubt that the federal
courts enforced State-created substantive rights if the mode of proceeding and remedy were
consonant with-the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure, and in so
doing they were enforcing rights created by the States and not arising under any inherent
or statutory federal law." Id. at 1468 (emphasis supplied). "The withdrawal of rights ex-
tinguished by statutes of limitations from the category of equitable remedies, brought about
by the present case (though it may fail to achieve its purposes of legal uniformity; see J.
Rutledge's dissent, id. at 1471) does not seem to go beyond that point in dealing with the
doctrine of equitable remedial rights, which it appears to recognize as subsisting (Ibid.,
especially the statement "But nothing that was decided, unless it be the Kirby case [Kirby
v. Lake Shore & M. J. Co., 120 U. S. 130 (1887), where the Court, considering its appli-
cation unequitable, disregarded a state statute of limitations] needs to be rejected.") As-
suming that relief against fraud in the obtaining of judgments is administered in accord-
ance with that theory, an interesting problem would arise if the right to seek avoidance of
a state judgment were subject to extinction by a state statute.
34. See Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 268 (U. S. 1851); In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888);
Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451 (1892); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202 (1893);
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30 (1935).
35. 147 F. (2d) 899,904.
36. Federal courts have long reserved discretionary powers for themselves in regard to
petitions for injunction against state judgments, so that the complainant will have to make
out a meritorious case before such powers are exercised on his behalf. See Marine Insurance
Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332 (U. S. 1813). They have required the com-
plainant to show, in his prayer for relief, that he had a good defense on the merits. White
v. Crow, 110 U. S. 183 (1884); Knox County v. Harshman, 133 U. S. 152 (1890); Massa-
chusetts Benefit Life Ass'n v. Lohmiller, 74 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 7th, 1896); Christy v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 214 Fed. 1016 (D. Colo. 1914); Lane v. Selby Shoe Co., 45 F. (2d)
581 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Matheson v. National Surety Co., 69 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 9th,
1934). The same principle, applied to accident and mistake, instead of fraud, has been
stated in Pickford v. Talbot, 225 U. S. 651 (1912). The complainant must also prove him-
self to be free from negligence, Brown v. County of Buena Vista, 95 U. S. 157 (1877); Mc-
Intosh v. Wiggins, 123 F. (2d) 316 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), or his petition will be dismissed for
want of equity, Nitkey v. S. T. McKnight Co., 87 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). The rule
of discretion, in another aspect, is discussed by the Supreme Court in Di Giovanni v. Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64 (1935).
The need of meritorious grounds in order to sustain equitable interference with a judg-
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court would be able not only to dismiss cases not warranting its interposi-
tion, but also to look to the remedies a-ailable in state courts, and the use
made thereof by the litigants, to determine whether or not state procedure
was adequate and intended to be exclusive. On this basis, there should be
little ground left for conflict with state jurisdictions, with no impairment
of the traditional equity powers of federal courts.0-
NECESSITY OF INTENT FOR INFRINGEMENT OF
COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT*
UNIMPAIRED by the terms of the federal statute,1 copyright protection at
common law is extended to all unpublished literary property.2 This so-called
ment has been emphasized by Justice Roberts in his dissent in Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238, 260 (1944). The majority opinion exprezss adherence to the
same rule (id. at 244, 246) and the difference in results must be accounted for on the basis of
the respective appraisals of the merits of the case.
37. Compare Note (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 788, 795.
De Acosta . Brown, 146 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), affg 50 F. Supp. 615 (S. D
N. Y. 1944), cert. denied, 65 Sup. Ct. 1197, 1198 (U. S. 1945).
1. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or
proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying,
publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages
therefor." 35 STAT. 1076 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 2 (1940). Cf. the English law, 2 Gco. V, c. 46,
§ 31 (1911), which abrogates all common-law rights. See note 52 infra.
The present copyright law was basically enacted on March 4, 1909, 35 STA-T. 1075
(1909), 17 U. S. C. §§ 1-62 (1940), after extended Congre Aional conferenceo. S- H. R.
REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) 1-4.
Federal control of copyright is based on the constitutional provision that "The Con-
gress shall have power . . . To promote the progress of science and useful arts by i2curing
for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their respective viting . .. ."
U. S. Co.NsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. S. Prior to the adoption of this clause in 1787, the state5 legif-
lated individually on copyright. See Fisher Mlusic Co., Inc. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U. S.
643 (1943); BOWnER, COPYRIGHT (1912) 35; WELL, AMERICAN COpT.GniT Lmw (1917) 16-7.
On the motion of James Madison, however, the Continental Congress in May 1783 rezom-
mended that the states pass uniform acts securing copyright for a pariod of fourteen yczxz.
24 JouRmtALs OF THE CoNrIxN.hAL CONGRESS (Hunt, ed., 1922) 326-7. See alko Fcnning,
Copyright Before t1w ConslWzdion (1935) 17 J. P.AT. OF. Soc. 379; Prercelings in Congress
During the Years 1789 and 1790, Rading to the First Patent and CopyrigIjt Laws (1940) 22
J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 243.
2. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834); Ferrisv. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912);
Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (C. C.A. 2d, 1896): RCA Mfg. Co., Inc.v.Whiteman,
114 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912);
State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 752, 110 N. W. 763 (1906); Oertel v. Wood, 40 How. 10
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1870); Duke of Queensberr v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden 329, 28 Eng. Rep. R. 924
(Ch. 1758); Macldin v. Richardson, Amb. 694, 27 Eng. Rep. R. 451 (Ch. 1770); Thomp-on
v. Stanhope, Amb. 737, 27 Eng. Rep. R. 476 (Ch. 1774); Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan:. 403,
36 Eng. Rep. R. 670 (Ch. 1818); Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. R. 6S1
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common-law copyright 3 rests upon a judicial recognition that creators of
artistic works,4 like those of scientific,5 call into being an incorporeal property
(1854). See BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY (19,4) c. 18; Corwoir,
LAW OF COPYRIGHT (7th ed. 1936) 3, 4, 21; DRONE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLEC-
TUAL PRODUCTIONS (1879) c. I; Doozan, Pre-Copyright Rights (1939) 14 NOTRE DAmE
LAWYER 391; Pickard, Common-Law Rights Before Publication (1940) 11 OKLA. B. A. J. 679.
One of the great legal controversies of all time took place during the eighteenth century
when the courts of England were called upon to determine whether copyright, independent
of royal grant, existed at common law and if it did, whether the first British copyright
statute, 8 ANNE, c. 19 (1710), had destroyed it. The first case squarely presenting this issue,
Tonson v. Collins, I Bl. W. 301, 321, 96 Eng. Rep. R. 169 (K. B. 1760), was dismissed as
collusive before the judges gave opinions. In Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. R.
201 (K. B. 1769), a majority of the court decided that common-law copyright did exist and
that it survived both a general publication of the work concerned and registration under the
Statute of Anne, supra. The reign of "perpetual copyright" was short-lived, however, for
in the famous case of Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 257 (K. B. 1774),
the House of Lords held that the Statute of Anne restricted the rights of another registering
a work under it to the term of years therein provided. Though this decision affirmed the
existence of common-law copyright after publication, cases during the following century
strongly opposed it. See, e.g., Jefferys v. Boosey, supra; Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435,
35 Eng. Rep. R. 1006 (Ch. 1817); Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. R.
1171 (Ch. 1849). In the United States the law has always been adverse to an author's
possessing common-law rights after a publication of his work. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet.
591 (U. S. 1834). For excellent accounts of this controversy see 6 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY or
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1937) 360-79; BALL, supra, at 16-27; Kilgore, Outline of Lecture on
Copyright Legislation before the Practising Law Institute of New York, Nov. 17, 1944, at
18-28.
3. The term "common-law copyright" is a misnomer, because the exclusive right to
make copies for publication arises only by a securing of statutory copyright. See Finkelstein,
Book Review (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 712, 713.
4. The early cases involved books. See Tonson v. Collins, 1 BI. W. 301, 96 Eng.
Rep. R. 169 (K. B. 1760); Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 201 (K. B. 1769);
Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 257 (K. B. 1774). Nevertheless, there
has been little doubt that the works of composers, sculptors, painters, photographers, and
miscellaneous others are similarly protected. See Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E.
109 (1912) (personal letters); Brown v. Ferris, 122 Misc. 418, 204 N. Y. Supp. 190 (Mun.
Ct. 1924) (dramatic work); Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 93 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937) (motion picture); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F. (2d)
80 (C. C.A. 2d, 1940) 27 VA. L. REv. 230 (dress designs); Stem v. Laemmle Music Co., 74 Misc.
262, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (Sup. Ct. 1911) (musical composition); Nutt v. National In-
stitute for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (text of lecture);
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904) (painting);
Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 Fed. 244 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), aff'd, 248
U. S. 215 (1918) ("news"); Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S. W. (2d) 282 (1938)
(architectural plans); Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S. D. 488, 47 N. W. 814 (1890)
(code used in business); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl.
631 (1937) (performer's rendition). The common law thus gives protection to many forms
of literary property not copyrighted by statute.
The Waring case, supra, an important extension of common-law copyright, has been
widely discussed. See Baer, Performer's Right to Enjoin Unlicensed Broadcasts of Recorded
Renditions (1941) 19 N. C. L. REv. 202; Clineberg, Protection Afforded by the Law of Copy.
right to Recording Artists in Their Interpretation of Musical Compositions (1941) 20 NEii. L.
REv. 79; Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist in his Interpretiho
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which is separable from the material substances utilized and which in the
interests of fairness and the encouraged propagation of culture should be
reserved to themY Lasting as long as the work is not disclosed to the general
public without statutory copyright," common-law rights enable an author,
Rendition (1940) 9 LAW Soc. J. 327,46S, 575; Traicoff, Rights of thc Perfcrmning Artist irn Us
Interpretation and Performance (1940) 11 AIR L. REv. 225; Comment (1941), 37 ILL. L. Rv.
245; Notes (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 504, (1938) 6 GEo. WrAsm L. REv. 237, (1937) 51 HAnr. L.
Rnv. 171, (1938) 24 VA. L. Rnv. 333, (1933) 23 W.xsA. U. L. Q. 233.
5. "Each individual, by the natural rights of mankind, is entitled to erxercisa an un-
controuled power over every kind of property of which he is once legally in poz_ ::on;
whether obtained by purchase, or produced by labour." Gooso:, LAW or PATEw;TS ron
INVENTIONS AND OF COYMRIGHT (1823) 1 (emphasis supplied). See Crown Dye & Tool Co.
v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U. S. 24,35,36 (1923); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1
(1913); Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U. S. 33, 390, 391 (1929); E. I. du Pont
de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 (1917); B.ra=~r, PAEreT PIZorrnTr
AND THE ANVI-MoNooLY L.Aws (1943) 26-7; Cop.-nroN,; LAW oF LmrTERs-PAiTr;T (18355)
25-8. Cf. The Clothworkers of Ipswich Cwe, Godbolt 252, 78 Eng. Rep. R. 147 (K. B.
1614). The best analogy, though imperfect, to common-law copyright is the protection
afforded trade-secrets. See Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, 299 I11. 532, 132 N. E. 70G
(1921); Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S. W. 834 (1925); Bell &
Bogart Soap Co. v. Petrolia Mfg. Co., 25 Misc. 66, 54 N. Y. Supp. 663 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
6. Paige v. Banks, 13 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1871); Kortlander v. Bradford, 116 Mizc. 664,
190 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Clay County Abstract Co. v. McKay, 226 Ala. 394,
147 So. 407 (1933); American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 2M4 (1907); see WrIL,
AZIERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW (1917) 109. Cf. the express provision of the Copyright Act:
".... The copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and
the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of it-solf con-
stitute a transfer of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright constitute a
transfer of the title to the material object...." 35 STr4. 1034 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 41
(1940).
7. Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 207 App. Div. 311, 202 N. Y. Supp. 164 (15t Dept.
1923); Kurfissv. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S. W. (2d) 232 (1933); see BI.L, LAW or
CoPYRIGnT AND LITERARY PROPERTY (1944) 474. See note 19 mipra.
The copyright laws of England and the United States do not recognize a moral or
privacy right in the author, but only a property right. Cf. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of
Priracy (1890) 4 HARv. L. Rv. 193.
S. Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2403, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 257 (K. B. 1774); Caliga v.
Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182 (1909); Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912);
Tribune Co. of Chicago v. Associated Press, 116 Fed. 126 (N. D. I1. 1900); Loews, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, IS Cal. (2d) 419, 115 P. (2d) 983 (1941). See Assoutn,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAcTicE (1936) 32-5,351-2.
There is no definition in the present copyright act of "publication." A publication
sufficient to destroy common-law copyright has been defined as "one which communicate3 a
knowledge of [the work's] contents under conditions expressly or impliedly precluding it-
dedication to the public." Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324
(C. C. A. 2d, 1904). In the following cases the author's action was considered a "publica-
tion": Stern v. Remick Co., 175 Fed. 282 (S. D. N. Y. 1910) (-ale of a single copy); D'Ole v.
Kansas City Star Co., 94 Fed. 840 (W. D. Mo. 1899) (leaving copies in hotel lobby for
gratuitous distribution); Blanchett v. Ingram, 3 T. L. R. 637 (Q. B. Div. 1S37) (gratuitous
distribution of song copies in music hall); Jewelers' Mere. Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub.
Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 49 N. E. 872 (1898) (leasing of copies); Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App.
397, 121 S. W. (2d) 232 (1933) (building of house from architect's plans); Fashion Origina-
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for example, without forfeiture to circulate copies privately among his
friends for their enjoyment 0 or among publishers for their criticism,10 to
license a reproduction for restricted distribution," to enjoin an unauthorized
publication of whatever sort,12 and to sell or assign his rights imposing such
conditions as he sees fit.'3
During this qualified circulation, however, ample opportunity for in-
fringement of the common-law copyright is afforded those directly or in-
directly gaining access. That an intentional appropriation of protected
property renders the malfeasor liable in damages is beyond cavil; 14 yet,
because of the obvious difficulties of determining whether material, ap-
parently in the public domain, is actually protected at common law, the
liability of one who innocently infringes seems not equally clear. In a recent
case squarely presenting this question, 1 plaintiff De Acosta had written an
historical screen play with the life story of Clara Barton, founder of the
American Red Cross, as the underlying theme, improving the plot by the
creation of several major characters and events, and without previous copy-
right registration had submitted the completed work to a movie producer for
approval. Defendant Brown later wrote a novel also fictionizing Clara
Barton's life, which defendant Hearst Magazines, Inc., extracted and pub-
lished in Cosmopolitan under a department heading of "The Nonfiction Book
Digest." Affirming the decision of the district court that Brown's work
clearly infringed De Acosta's, 6 a divided Second Circuit Court of Appeals 17
tors' Guild of America v. FTC, 114 F. (2d) 80 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (exposure for sale of gar-
ment made from patterns); Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 703 (C. C. D. Mass. 1896) (loan of
copies to anyone desiring them).
9. Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & S. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. R. 293 (Ch. 1849), af'd, 1
Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. R. 1171 (Ch. 1849); Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967,
No. 1076 (C. C. D. Ohio 1849).
10. Kenrick v. Danube Collieries & Minerals Co., 39 W. R. 473 (Ch. 1891); Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73
Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
11. Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 737,27 Eng. Rep. R. 476 (Ch. 1774).
12. Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435, 35 Eng. Rep. R. 1006 (Ch. 1817): Prince Albert
v. Strange, 2 DeG. & S. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. R. 293 (Ch. 1849), aff'd, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 41
Eng. Rep. R. 1171 (Ch. 1849); Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d,
1896).
13. Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872). The following "publications" were held
also too limited to destroy common-law copyright: O'Neill v. General Film Co., 152 N. Y.
Supp. 599 (Sup. Ct. 1915) (display of posters showing scenes of play); Dentacura Co. v.
N. J. State Dental Society, 57 N. J. Eq. 593 (1898), af'd, 58 N. J. Eq. 582 (1899) (reading of
paper to professional group); Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912) (public performance of
play); Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967, No. 1076 (C. C. D. Ohio 1849) (lecture to
pupils).
14. See A.MDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1936) cc. 20,21; BALL, LAW OF COPY-
RIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY (1944) cc. 13-5; WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW (1917)
c. 17.
15. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), aff'g 50 F. Supp. 615
(S. D. N. Y. 1944).
16. De Acosta v. Brown, 50 F. Supp. 615 (S. D. N.Y. 1944).




also held that the defendant publisher vwas liable for both damages and
profits despite its established good faith in the infringing publication.
On the basis of legal reasoning and precedent this disregard of the pub-
lisher's condition of mind appears sound.'5 The remedy for infringement of
copyright lay at common law in action on the case I or in equity in a bill
for an injunction and accounting,23 for neither of which v,as an allegation or
proof of intent necessary to state an actionable cause; 21 and, while there
have been occasional expressions of opinion to the contrary,22 the American
18. Compare (1945) 58 -LiR. L. RvE'. 615.
19. Millar x. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2396, 93 Eng. Rep. R. 201, 251 (K. B. 1769); No-
vello v. Sudlow, 12 C. B. 177, 13S Eng. Rep. R. 369 (C. P. 18352); Roworth V. Wilkes, 1
Camp. 94, 170 Eng. Rep. R. SS9 (C. P. 1807). See Smin'zx,, Conno.-Lntw Ptw ux
(3d ed. 1923) 85 et seg.
20. Clement v. Maddick, 1 Giff. 93, 65 Eng. Rep. R. 341 (Ch. 1859); Colburn v. Simms,
2 Hare 543, 67 Eng. Rep. R. 224 (Ch. 1843).
21. 'Mansell v. The Valley Printing Co., [1903] L. R. 1 Ch. D. 567 at'd, [19031 L. R. 2
Ch. D. 441; see layall v. Higbey, 1 H. & C. 148, 153 Eng. Rep. R. S37 ( Ex. 1862); Caird
v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326 (187).
In Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. R. 257 (K. B. 1774) nine of the
twelve judges agreed that "at common law, an author of any book or literary compaxl-tion
had the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for Eale; and might bring an
action against any person who printed, published and sold the same without his conca-nt."
Id. at 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. R. at 257. (Emphasis supplied.) Inferentially demonstrating that
the issue of intent was argued, two of the judges (Mr. Baron Pcrrott and Mr. Baron Adams)
said that an action could not be brought "unlezs such pcrzon obtained the copy Zyfrnrid cr
violence." Id. at 2413, 93 Eng. Rep. R. at 260. (Emphasis supplied.) The dcclaration in
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 93 Eng. Rep. R. 201 (I. B. 1769), alleged that the "latter
books had been injuriously printed by some person or persons WITnouT the licEnse or ccn-
sent of the plaintiff 'Millar; the defendant knowing 'that they had ben Eo injuriouly
printed .... ' " Id. at 2309, 98 Eng. Rep. R. at 205. (Emphasis as in original.) Several
of the judges, however, apparently regarded the allegation as unneceszary. S2, c.g., the
opinion of Mr. Justice Aston: "The inrasion of this sort of property is as much against
every man's sense of it, as it is against natural reason and voral rcditude. It is against the
conviction of every man's own breast, who attempts it. He knows it, not to be his own: he
knows, he injures another; and he does not do it for the sake of the public, but nalafide et
aninzo lucrandi." Id. at 2342-3, 93 Eng. Rep. R. 222. (Emphasis as in original.)
22. Leader v. Strange, 2 Car. & K. 1010, 175 Eng. Rep. R. 425 (C. P. 1319); cf. Casino
Productions, Inc. v. Vitaphone Corp., 163 Misc. 403, 295 N. Y. Supp. 501 (Sup. Ct. 1937);
Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 231, 171 N. E. 56 (1930).
"The literary larcenist must do more than filch ideas, imitate mannerisms, repat
information, borrow phrases, utilise quotations; you must be able to attribute to him the
felonious intention of appropriating without independent labour a material part of a pro-
tected work." Bims.LL, THE LAw A D Histony or CopyrIXnIT (1899) 169-70 (emphazz
supplied).
In Barry v. Hughes, 103 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. denicd, 303 U. S. 01
(1939), the court said: "It has been held that one who copies from a plagiarist is him: f
necessarily a plagiarist, however innocent he may be .. ., but that would be a harzh rpsult,
and contrary to the general doctrine of torts. . . . Laying aside a possible action for unjt.st
enrichment, or for an injunction after discovery, we should hesitate a long while bcfore
holding that the use of material, apparently in the public demene, subjected the u:2r to
damages, unless something put him actually on notice."
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cases in both statutory 23 and common-law 24 copyright have uniformly fol-
lowed this principle. Moreover, if one accepts the analogy of infringement
to conversion used by both majority and dissent 1h the De Acosta case," the
holding is strengthened by the fact that in trover the will to convert is
never in issue.26 It is true that under the federal act the existence of intent to
23. "Intention to infringe is not essential under the Act." Buck v. Jewell-La Salle
Realty Co., 233 U. S. 191, 198 (1931). See also Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207
(1935); Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100 (1919); Chappell & Co.,
Inc. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
24. American Press Association v. Daily Story Publishing Co., 120 Fed. 766 (C. C. A.
7th, 1902), appeal dismissed, 193 U. S. 675 (1904); Norris v. No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co.,
271 Fed. 536 (D. Md. 1921), aff'd, 277 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921).
"This is not a criminal case, and intent is not a necessary element of the cause of action."
Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 54 F. Supp. 425,431 (E. D. Mo, 1944).
The leading English case is Mansell v. The Valley Printing Co., [1908] L. R. 1 Ch. D.
567, aff'd, [1908] L. R. 2 Ch. D. 441.
25. "Here the analogy of the cases has always been that of the conversion of literary
property; and as in the American Press case cited above [American Press Ass'n v. Daily
Story Pub. Co., 120 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902), appeal dismissed, 193 U. S. 675 (1904) 1,
that analogy here is complete to justify recovery as against even an innocent copier." Judge
Clark for the majority in De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 408,412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
"I accept the analogy of conversion; it is true that if, for instance, I carry off as mine
another's watch in my bag, it is no excuse that I think it mine. However, I do not convert
it, whatever acts of dominion I exercise over my bag, if I do not know, or am not chargeable
with notice, that there is a watch in the bag, though I may have equally denied the owner's
right. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 222 Comment (d) 'Necessity of Intention,' Comment (d)
(sic) 'Character of Intent Necessary.'" Judge Learned Hand, dissenting in id. at 413.
Judge Hand's example, however, may be distinguished in that Hearst knew it was dealing
with "literary property," whoever the owner, whereas the above converter of the bag was
unaware by hypothesis that a watch was inside. See note 26 infra.
In Clay County Abstract Co. v. McKay, 226 Ala. 394, 147 So. 407 (1933). The court
held that no cause of action lay in trover for infringement of common-law copyright, but
that the proper form was action on the case.
26. "However hard it may be on those who deal innocently and in the ordinary course
of business with a person in possession of goods, yet, as long as the law, as laid down in
Hartman v. Booth, 1 H. & C. 803 (Ex. 1863) is unimpeached, I think it is clear law, that if
there has been what amounts in law to a conversion of the plaintiff's goods, by anyone,
however innocent, that person must pay the value of the goods to the real owners, the
plaintiffs. See Stephens v. Elwall, 4 M. & S. 259 (K. B. 1815) and Garland v. Carlisle, 4 Cl.
& F. 693 (H. L. 1837)." Hollins v. Fowler, 7 L. R. H. L. 757 (1875). See SHIPMAN, COMMON-
LAw PLEADING (3d ed. 1923) 227 et seq.
"Unless the actor intended so to deal with the chattel as to deprive the other of its
possession, no action can be maintained under the rule stated in this Section although the
actor may be liable under some other rule of law." RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 222,
Comment (d). "The intention necessary to subject to liability one who deprives another
of the possession of his chattel is merely the intention to deal with the chattel so that such
dispossession results. It is not necessary that the actor intend to commit what he knows to be a
trespass or a conversion. It is, however, necessary that his act be one which he knows to be
destructive of any outstanding possessory right, if such there be." RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) § 222, Comment (d) (sic) (emphasis supplied).
Section 244 of the Torts Restatement removes liability from a converter for "mistake"
only if he is induced by the owner that he is the possessor or is entitled to immediate posses-
sion, has the consent of the owner, or is otherwise privileged to act.
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infringe is material when the required notice of copyright has inadvertently
been omitted 27 and when the penal provisions of the act are invoked, -3 but
such instances are readily distinguishable on grounds of the involvement of a
statute,2 the absence of any requirement at common law that notice of
reserved rights be given," and the necessity under the criminal law, for prov-
ing at least a general intent in order to sustain a conviction.31 Furthermore,
though once again distinguishable on the basis of statutory involvement,
those provisions of the act dealing generally Vith damages do not require
that an infringement be wilful.3 2
As a matter of practical policy, however, the De Acosta case may be criti-
cized as giving an unnecessarily harsh solution to the problem; a publisher
acting in good faith upon an infringer's assurance of the originality of his
work is held absolutely liable even though no alternative method of deter-
mining the existence of possible common-law copyright is feasible. The
majority opinion met this objection by saying, "if it be suggested that other
more effective means of inquiry are not conveniently available to publishers,
then that seems an additional reason for not depriving authors so easily of
the fruits of their labors." '3 In an attempt to avoid placing "an appreciable
incubus upon the freedom of the press," 34 however, the dissenting judge
distinguished the copying of a known original, as by a thus deliberately
infringing author, from the copying of a purported original, as by an inno-
cent publisher relying upon the assurances or "license" of an infringer:
27. "Where the copyright proprietor has sought to comply with the provizions of this
Act with respect to notice, the omission by accident or mistake of the preccribed notice .. .
shall prevent the recovery of damages against an innocent infringer who has been mnied
by the omission of the notice. . . ." 35 STAT. 10S0 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 20 (1940). Sce
Comment, Innocent Participants in Copyright Infringement (1939) 8 FonrnDm L. REv. 400.
28. ". . . Any person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright ccured
by this Act, or who shall knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringement, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by im-
prisonment for not exceeding one year or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $10OO,
or both, in the discretion of the court. . . ." 35 STAT. 1032 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 28 (1940).
See also 35 STAT. 1082 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 29 (1940).
29. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Hearst Magazines, Inc., p. 5. Do Acosta
v. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
30. See DRoNE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS (1879) 97-104;
WVEHe, A CERIAN COPYRIGHT LAw (1917) c. V; PicL-ard, Cor,non-Law Rigi7!s Befere Put!,c-
tion (1940) 11 OLA. B. A. J. 679, 632-3.
31. "Generally it is a principle of the common law that a crime is not committed if the
mind of the person doing the act in question is innocent. 'Actus non facit reum, niai mens -it
rea' is a maxim of the criminal law." MILLER, Crmn..u, LAw (1934) 52. See Regina v
Tolson, 23 Q. B. Div. 168, 172 (1889); Chisholm v. Doulton, 22 Q. B. Div. 736 (1889).
32. Section 25 of the Copyright Act provides that "any" person infringing a copyright
protected by the law of the United States shall be liable to an injunction and damages. In a
few specified cases, however, if the infringement is innocent, the damages are limited in
amount. 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), 37 STAT. 4S9 (1912), 17 U. S. C., § 25 (1940).
33. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 403,412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
34. Id. at 413.
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upon a defendant's establishing that the latter were the case, the plaintiff
should be limited to an injunction and accounting of profits and denied
damages.35 Whether one accepts this novel 16 and somewhat tenuous dis-
tinction, it seemingly provides a more satisfactory basis for determining
upon which of two innocents the harm shall fall. Literary property, unlike
most other forms of personalty, is pervasive, existing simultaneously in all
countries giving it legal recognition, and since it is so easily capable of being
mistakenly appropriated by any person at any time, practicability and fair-
ness to publishers would place part of the burden on the author for not tak-
ing all steps possible to make himself known." After all, the present act
provides for registration and copyright of unpublished works,3 by which
authors and other creators may give at least constructive, if not actual,"0
notice of their reserved rights. Such registration would, in fact, redound to
their benefit, for statutory damages for infringement are often larger than
those provable at common law.40
Additional criticism of the De Acosta case may be directed at the district
court's decree, affirmed without question by the circuit court majority,
which granted an accounting of botls profits and damages to the plaintiff.4'
Formerly, when the jurisdiction of courts lay either at law or in equity, the
type of remedy obtainable, either profits or damages, was predetermined by
the court in which suit was brought. 42 With the general abolition of distinc-
35. Id. at 414.
36. No case was discovered which drew the same distinction, although in Barry v.
Hughes, 103 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 604 (1939), the court used
something of the same idea. See note 22 supra.
37. ". . . In copyright, property has reached a more abstract expression. The right
to exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak.
It restrains the spontaneity of men where, but for it, there would be nothing of any kind to
hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or
tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand miles from the owner
and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong. It is a right which could not be recog-
nized or endured for more than a limited time, and therefore, I may remark in passing, it is
one which hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute, as the authorities now
agree." Mr. Justice Holmes in White-Smith Mus. Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1,
19 (1908).
38. 35 STAT. 1078 (1909),37 STAT.488 (1912), 17U.S. C. § 11(1940).
39. In accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act, 35 STAT. 1086 (1909), 17
U. S. C. § 56 (1940), the Copyright Office publishes frequent catalogues of copyright entries,
containing the titles and authors of both published and unpublished copyrighted works,
Many publishing firms keep a scrupulous check on the entries listed, both to detect infringe-
ments of their publications and to prevent their own infringing of others'. Communication
to YALE LAW JOuRNAL, from Harwood Publishing Co., Hollywood, Cal., Apr. 16, 1945.
40. Section 25 of the Copyright Act provides generally for statutory, in lieu of actual,
damages of not less than $250 nor more than $5,000. 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), 37 STAT. 489
(1912), 17 U. S. C. § 25 (1940). Cf. "But generally speaking, damages will be difficult of
proof and the amount of recovery is likely to be small." Judge Clark for the majority in
De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 408,412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
41. DeAcostav. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 408,410 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
42. Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583 (U. S. 1868); Marsh v. Seymour, 97
[Vot,5 4
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tions between the legal and equitable benches, however, combined with
statutory enlargement of judicial powers, 3 this mutual exclusion of remedy
has somewhat disappeared. Most courts have continued to issue decrees
granting relief in one form or the other44 at the plaintiff's election, but
others, apparently to inflict punishment, have awarded both forms.45 While
it is arguable that the issue of propriety in a court's so doing is largely
academic because damages and/or profits are often minimal or not prova-
ble," there are presumably many instances when a defendant's liability
would be greatly increased by a decree granting additive, rather than al-
ternative, relief. Such a practice is, moreover, foreign to the analogous fields
of patents,47 trademarkss and unfair competition,43 in which in the absence
of statute the elements of fraud or gross wilfulness are necessary for similar
treatment: While all three circuit court judges sitting on the principal case
agreed that the prevention of an unjust enrichment would require Hearst
to account for profits,"0 and while it appears doctrinally correct despite con-
U. S. 348 (1877); Goldmark v. Kreling, 25 Fed. 349, 355-7 (C. C. D. Cal. ISSS); Stevens v.
Gladding, 23 Fed. Cas. 14, No. 13,399 (C. C. D. R. I. 18S6): Social Register As'n v. Murphy,
129 Fed. 148 (C. C. D. R. I. 1904); cf. Strauss v. Penn Printing & Pub. Co., 220 Fed. 977
(E. D. Pa. 1915); P. E. Sharpless Co. v. Lawrence, 213 Fed. 423 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914). S-a
also cases cited supra notes 19, 20.
43. The Copyright Act in § 25b, 35 STmT. 10S1 (1909), as amended, 37 STAT. 489 (1912),
17 U. S. C. § 25b, provides that an infringer shall be liable "to pay to the copyright proprietor
such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as sd!
as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement, ... or in
lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear to be just...
(Emphasis supplied.)
44. See, e.g., Casino Productions, Inc. v. Vitaphone Corp., 163 Misc. 403, 295 N. V. S.
501 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
In England "an account of profits and an inquiry as to damages" are not simultancouly
obtainable. COPINGER, CoPRmIGHT (7th ed. 1936) 159. See De Vitre v. Betts, L. R. 6
H. L. 319 (1873).
45. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 408, 410 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Dieckhaus v. Twen-
tieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 54 F. Supp. 425,432-3 (E. D.' Mo. 1944).
46. See note 40 supra.
47. Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189 (1831). In a report of a House patents Commit-
tee it was said: "Section 25 [of the Copyright Act] deals with the matter of civil remedies for
infringement of a copyright... The provision that the copyright proprietor may have
such damages as well as the profits which the infringer shall have made is substantially the
same proxision found in section 4921 of the Revised Statutes relating to remedien for the
infringement of patents. The courts lare usually construed that to mean tMat tMe o-mer of t7-
patent might huare one or the other, whichver was the greater. As such provision was found both
in the trade-mark and patent laws, the committee felt that it might be proparly included in
the copyright laws." H. R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) 15. (Emphasis cup-
plied.)
48. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 259 (1916); aee
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (1879); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S.
403 (1916); cf. L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wnm. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U. S. 97 (1923).
49. P. E. Sharpless Co. v. Lawrence, 213 Fed. 423 (C. C.A. 3d, 1914).
50. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F. (2d) 403,410,414 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
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trary considerations of policy 51 to derive a liability at common law for
damages, no rational basis for joinder of the remedies is anywhere indicated.
An appropriate criterion would appear presented by the infringer's state of
mind, which in this case being innocent would negative the need for a puni-
tive decree.
In order to solve the problems of common-law copyright illustrated by the
De Acosta case, there would appear necessary an amendment of the federal
copyright act, perhaps on the lines of the British or Canadian laws.5 2 The
result sought by the dissent could be achieved simply by making intent to
infringe an element of the common-law cause of action. If common-law
rights were totally abolished, however, as they have been in England,5 3
creators for their own protection would be forced to register their works
under the act, thereby serving the dual function of giving notice to all
prospective users and of preserving works which through non-publication or
non-registration may be lost. Since the existing common law of copyright
appears in operation neither efficient nor equitable, such or similar changes
by Congress seem indicated to remove the present temptation for judicial
legislation.
51. Seesuprap. 700.
52. "Where proceedings are taken in respect of the infringement of the copyright in any
work and the defendant in his defence alleges that he was not aware of the existence of the
copyright in the work, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any remedy other than an injunc-
tion or interdict in respect of the infringement if the defendant proves that at the date of the
infringement he was not aware and had no reasonable ground for suspecting that copyright
subsisted in the work." 2 GEO. V, c. 46, § 8 (1911). Under the English law registration pro-
visions are entirely omitted, although deposit at the British Museum of one copy of each
book published is compulsory. Id. § 15. Common-law copyright is expressly abrogated. Id.
§ 31. See BowKER, COPYRIGHT (1912) 378; COPINGER, COPYRIGHT (7th ed, 1936) 160-3.
The Canadian law contains a provision, Chapter 32, R. S. C. § 22 (1927), very similar to § 8
of the English law, above. Registration is, however, required under the Canadian act,
Chapter 32, R. S. C. §§ 37-40 (1927). See Fox, CANADIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1944)
458-61; Note, Canadian Copyright in Unpublished Manuscripts (1938) 8 FORT. L. J. 72-3.
The American Copyright Act has undergone since 1909 only minor amendments. See,
e.g., 37 STAT. 488-90 (1912); 37 STAT. 724-5 (1913); 38 STAT. 311 (1914); 41 STAT. 368-9
(1919); 44 STAT. 818 (1926); 45 STAT. 713-4 (1928); 52 STAT. 6-7 (1938); 53 STAT. 1142
(1939); 54 STAT. 51 (1940); 54 STAT. 106 (1940). Various authors have discussed the need for
revision of the act. See Caldwell, A Suggested Modelfor a Copyright Act (1932) 2 J. RADIO L.
315; Diamond and Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and Phonograph Records (1940) 11
AIR L. REv. 29; Solberg, Copyright Reform: Legislation and International Copyright (1939)
14 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 343; Solberg, The New Copyright Bill (1940) 15 NOTRE DAMr
LAWYER 123; Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 433; Legis. (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 906.
53. See note 52 supra.
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INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT UNDER
THE SHERMAN ACT..
THE Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "No
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." I The problem of
defining "infamous crime" is raised by the recent circuit court of appeals
decision American Tobacco Company v. United States 2 in which a criminal
anti-trust action was brought against corporate and individual defendants
by information rather than by the indictment of a grand jury.3 It was held
that a violation of the Sherman Act 4 is not an infamous crime and that a
prosecution started by information was therefore not in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
Historically, the requirement of indictment or presentment in cases
involving serious crimes- wras intended to protect citizens from criminal
prosecutions when the prima facie case against them was either insufficient
or undisclosed.6 While no exact rule for distinguishing infamous from lesser
* American Tobacco Company v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 6th, 194.4).
1. U.S. CoqsT. A-uENo. V.
2. 147 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944).
3. American Tobacco Company v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914),
appears to be the first case prosecuted to judgment under the Sherman Act, 26 StArt. 209
(1890), 15 U. S. C. § 4 (1940), in which criminal information was used. Since its decision,
however, the Department of Justice has commenced a criminal suit against the Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. by means of information-N. Y. Times, April 17, 1945, p. 29,
col. 1.
The advantage to the prosecution of proceeding by information when there is 5uftfient
evidence to obtain indictment is not very clear. Although it does not involve the delay of
grand jury proceedings the use of that body's subpoena powers must be foregone. In anti-
trust cases in which the defendants' own documents are often important parts of the evi-
dence against them this power may be of considerable importance. It is true, however, that
information has the advantage of being susceptible to amendment, whereas indictment dcea
not. Armstrong v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), ert. de:cd, 273 U. S.
766 (1927). For a general discussion of the respective advantage of information and indict-
ment see Dession, From Indictment to Information-Imp !ications of the Shift (1932) 42
YALE L. J. 163.
4. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 4 (1940).
5. The use of information by the Attorney General was forbidden at common law,
in the case of all capital crimes. "But . . . informations [of every kind] are confined by the
constitutional law to mere misdemeanours only." 4 BL. CoWL!. 0310.
Procedure by information was also forbidden by statute, 25 EDw. III, stat. 5, c. 4
(1351), in the following words: ". . . none shall be taken by petition or suggestion made to
our lord the King, or to his council, unless it be by indictment or presentment of gowl and
lawful people of the same neighbourhood where such deeds be done, in due manner, or by
process made by writ original at the common la. ... ." These words were repeated in the
Petition of Right, 1640, 16 CHAs. I., c. 10, but Blackstone says of the latter statute, that it
applies only to private informations, and not to those of the Attorney General. 4 BL.
Comms. "308-12.
6. For an excellent short account of the history and purposes of the grand jury eia
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crimes was established in the United States until after the Civil War, owing
perhaps to the custom of prosecuting almost all crimes by grand jury pro-
ceedings,7 the use of information later became more widespread. In order to
place some definite limitations upon its use, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte
Wilson,s repeating the common-law doctrine that whether a given crime
is infamous should be determined by the nature of the punishment which
might be imposed,9 held that an infamous crime was one punishable by im-
prisonment or by hard labor. 10
Mr. Justice Field's Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, No. 18,255 (C. C. D. Calif.
1872). See also SOMERS, A GUIDE TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES or
ENGLISHMEN (1771) 91-197; REPORT ON PROSECUTION (National Committee on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement, 1931) 23-7.
7. In 1833 Story wrote: "[Information] is rarely recurred to in America; and it has
never yet been formally put into operation by any positive authority of congress . . .
though common enough in civil prosecutions .... " 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON T1E CON-
STITUTION (1891) § 1780.
In Ex parle Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 425 (1885) the Court suggests that the practice of
using information for more serious crimes began about 1875. ". . . the general current of
opinion in the Circuit and District Courts [within the last fifteen years] has been towards
sustaining them [informations] for any crime, a conviction of which would not at common
law have disqualified the convict to be a witness." Some of the cases which support this
statement are: United States v. Shepard, 27 Fed. Cas. 1056, No. 16,273 (E. D. Mich. 1870);
United States v. Maxwell, 26 Fed. Cas. 1221, No. 15,750 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1875); United
States v. Miller, 26 Fed. Cas. 1257, No. 15,775 (N. D. N. Y. 1872); United States v. Yates,
6 Fed. 861 (E. D. N. Y. 1881); In re Wilson, 18 Fed. 33 (E. D. Mich. 1883).
8. 114 U. S. 417 (1885).
9. Id. at 423-6. "There are two kinds of infamy; the one founded in the opinions of
people respecting the mode of punishment; the other in the construction of the law respect-
ing the future credibility of the delinquent." EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAw (1770) c. 7,
§ 5. The former of Mr. Eden's criteria is to be emphasized in considering the protective
purpose of the Fifth Amendment. Its predominance is recognized by the Supreme Court in
Ex pare Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 423, 425-6 (1885): "Whether a convict shall be permitted to
testify is not governed by a regard to his rights or to his protection, but by the consideration
whether the law deems his testimony worthy of credit upon the trial the rights of others.
But whether a man shall be put upon his trial for crime without a presentment or indict-
ment by a grand jury of his fellow citizens depends upon the consequences to himself if he
shall be found guilty .... having regard to the object and the terms of the first provision
of the Fifth Amendment . . . this court is of opinion that the competency of the defendant,
if convicted, to be a witness in another case is not the true test [of infamy]."
10. "Imprisonment at hard labor . . . is, in the strongest sense of the words, 'in-
voluntary servitude for crime' . . . our judgment is that a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution . . ." Id. at 429.
The term has been most liberally applied. In United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433
(1922), it was held that confinement for six months in the District of Columbia workhouse,
in which the inmates worked chiefly on a farm in plain clothes, was hard labor, and an in-
famous punishment. But see Brede v. Powers, 263 U. S. 4 (1923), for an ingenious rather
than sound distinction between sentence to hard labor and actual subjection to it.
Hard labor has long been regarded as infamous punishment. 4 BL. CO-MM. *377; Jones
v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329 (Mass. 1857). Other punishments considered infamous by Black-
stone are whipping, the pillory, the stocks and the ducking pool, 4 BL. COMM. *377, and Dane
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This definition of "infamy" was well adapted to the prison system of the
time, under which the worst offenders were generally sent to state and later
to federal penitentiaries, or to hard labor in some other institution, while
persons convicted of misdemeanors and other minor offenses were sentenced
merely to the county jails."' In 1929 and 1930, however, far-reaching
changes in the federal prison system were undertaken, and legislation was
enacted empowering the Attorney General, rather than the trial judge, to
decide in what institution a sentence was to be served.12 In addition, the
Attorney General was given the power to ". . . make aN-ailable the serices
of federal prisoners for the purpose of constructing and repairing roads . . .
building levees and for the construction of other public works.... ., 13 The
purpose of this legislation was twofold: (1) to delegate to one authority the
office of assigning offenders to different institutions,14 and (2) to provide
"employment for all physically fit inmates of United States penal . . . in-
stitutions .... ,, 15
The federal prison system -was so changed by these laws ", that today the
milder offenders are those more likely to be found at hard work, while the
adds to these branding and cropping, 2 DA.mE, A GErmRAL An AmcNT, AN:D DiGsrsT o7
AemrncA. LAw (1823) 569-70. Imprisonment in a penitentiary has been declared infamou3
punishment in Mackln v. United States, 117 U. S. 343 (1886); United States v. Da Walt, 123
U. S. 393 (1888); In re Claasen, 140 U. S. 200 (1891). Confinement of minor offendcrs in
penitentiaries v.ithout their consent is forbidden by a recent statute. 55 ST,*YS. 743 (1941),
IS U.S. C. § 753(f) (Supp. 1944). See note 27 infra.
11. See RoBiNsoN, JALs, CARE AD TmEATLENT OF MISD-E._IEAN-rT Pnxso!Mms n:
m UNTED STTrEs (1944) 243. The housing of short-term federal offenders in local jails
is still a very common practice. "One of the glaring abuses of the present syzterm of puni-h-
ment is the confinement of short-term offenders in State and county jails and prisons, where
conditions are often unsanitary and, where inmates are brought into contact vwith influ-
ences which tend to degrade rather than improve them. It is universally recognized that the
ordinary county jail is a breeder of crime; and it is little short of dis2raceful that plx:ons
who have been committed for offenses of such minor character as not to dezarve a severe
prison sentence should be subjected to their influence." Report of the Judicial Coference of
tle Committee on Punishme t for Crime (July-Sep. 1942) 6 FEDERL^, PaoBATxio!. 40, 43.
12. 46 STAT. 326 (1930), as amended by 55 STAT. 743 (1941), 18 U.S. C. § 753(f) (Supp.
1944).
13. 46 STAT. 391 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 744(b) (Supp. 1944).
14. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress that the institutions estab-
lished . . . be so planned and limited in size as to facilitate the development of an inte-
grated Federal penal and correctional system which will aszure the proper claEsification and
segregation of Federal prisoners according to their character, the nature of the crime they
have committed, their mental condition ... " 46 STAT. 390 (1930), 18 U. S. C. § 907
(1940).
15. "It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to provide employment for all phys-
icallv fit inmates of United States penal and correctional institutions...." 46 STAT. 391
(1930), 18 U. S. C. § 744(a) (1940). Quaere whether all involuntary prison work is not
hard labor within the meaning of United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 (1922), cited
supra note 10.
16. "it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we have come to the parting of the ways. The
old prison system is being discarded." Mr. Sandford Bates, Hcarings L-sfre Cemmiltl.e or
Judiciary onH. R. 6807,7410,7411,7412,7413, 7832, 71st Cong., 2d Ses. (1929) 23
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more serious and intractable tend to be concentrated in the more leisurely,
albeit better guarded, institutions. 7 The result of these changes is to alter
the practical import of the doctrine of Ex parte Wilson."5 Since under the
statute all federal prisoners may be sent to hard labor,'9 the rule of that case
logically requires indictment for all offenses punishable by jail sentence, but,
possibly because of the difficulty of reconciling the doctrine with the existing
practices of the federal prison system, the courts have not taken this logical
step. 0
In order to resolve this difficulty the Government in the American Tobacco
case argued that the Attorney General does not have the power to send all
prisoners to road work 21 or other hard labor. A holding to this effect, how-
ever, would be unfortunate. The new prison system has been built upon the
broad discretionary powers of the Attorney General, and a decision involv-
ing retrogression toward the squalid and demoralizing idleness of the old-
fashioned county jail 22 is not advisable. Instead, a solution for the problem
should be found in a new conception of infamous crime.
The defendants in the American Tobacco case contended that all crimes
for which a jail sentence may be imposed should be regarded as infamous.
This view, which is the logical application of the doctrine of Ex parte Wil.
son 23 to the contemporary prison system, seems commendable. Its adop-
17. For instance, only males of "minimum custody or trustworthy type and in good
physical condition with fairly short sentences" are sent to federal prison camps (where road
work, etc., is undertaken). Circular No. 3058 revised, October 7, 1941 (U. S. Dep't Justice)
4. Compare the remarks of the warden of Alcatraz concerning employment of prisoners.
Report of the Warden, Alcatraz Penitentiary [1940 FEDERAL OFFENDERS 28,31.
18. See note 8 supra.
19. See note 13 supra. There seems no doubt that the work prescribed is hard labor in
a very strong sense. "An incentive is needed to get the prisoners to undergo the hardships
which working on the roads and public works involves .... A provision has, therefore,
been included in the bill permitting the Attorney General, if he sees fit, to allow three days
extra time to such prisoners. This is in accordance with the precedent already approved by
Congress in the bill" providing that upon written order of the Attorney General persons
convicted under the laws of the United States may be transferred to such prison camps for
employment upon roads and trail building, the cost of which is born exclusively by the
United States. H. R. REP. No. 103, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), 9190.
That short-term prisoners are in fact sent to hard labor is made clear from the statement
of Mr. James Bennett: "The prison camps [for road construction etc.] . .. form a valuable
part of the diversified correctional program. For the short-term prisoner who formally
served his sentence in a local jail, the camps offer a welcome substitute for months of idleness
in these institutions." REP. ATT'Y GEN. (1941) 212.
20. See United States v. Sloan, 31 F. Supp. 327 (W. D. S. C. 1940).
21. Oral argument before Ford, J., at trial. Counsel for the Government: "... if this
[the road work mentioned in the statute] is hard labor, a prisoner who was subjected to [it]
if he was merely a misdemeanant, would have his remedy."
22. For an account of conditions in local jails see BATES, PRISONS AND BEYOND (1938)
c. 3; Casey, Missouri Jail Survey in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 70TH ANNUAL CONG. Or AMER-
ICAN PISON Ass'Ns (1940) 402; REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA CRIME COMSSION (1929) 32;
ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF INSPECTION OF COUNTY JAILS OF MARYLAND (1935); Fir-
TEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF INSPECTION OF COUNTY JAILS OF MARYLAND (1939).
23. See note 8 supra.
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tion would involve only a return to the original federal practice under the
Bill of Rights, and it conforms with social mores which place a particular
stigma on those who have served in jail. The chief advantage, however,
of such a definition is that it would secure the right of grand jury investiga-
tion to a wider class of persons than presently enjoy it. At a time when the
number and variety of federal crimes, particularly of a prohibitory character,
are increasing, such an argument carries weight. It is true that the right to
demand the hearing of a grand jury does not always afford any great protec-
tion to the citizen; too often this assembly can be likened to an exceptionally
unwieldy rubber stamp.2 4 But institutions of the protective sort should be
judged by their potential utility rather than by everyday performance.
The modem tendency, however, is to reduce the functions of the grand
jury,25 and since it seems unrealistic to suppose that they will be increased
in the federal system, a more moderate definition may be useful. Any
significant definition of "infamous crime" must be based on the punishment
of which the accused stands in jeopardy. But since determination of the
type of imprisonment imposed is no longer made by the courts,=' and since
the punishment designated by the Attorney General is not primarily related
to the crime committed,-7 the only remaining test which can be universally
applied is the length of the maximum sentence which may be imposed. There
is some basis in practice and authority for classifying crimes involving a
penalty of more than one year as infamous,23 but whatever period may be
24. For an interesting criticism of the grand jury system see Dession, From Irdictiri.nt
to Information-Implications ofthe Shift (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 163; REFoRT o!. PnosucrTro.m
(U. S. National Commission on Law Obser-ance and Enforcement, 1931) 124-6.
25. By 1931 nineteen states had eliminated the requirement of grand jury indictment
and three more had restricted it to capital crimes. Id. at 35.
26. Although the 1930 act, 46 STAT. 326, paid lip service to the power of the judge to
sentence to a given type of institution by directing that convicts . .. shall be committed,
for such terms of imprisonment and to such types of institutions as the court may direct, to
the custody of the Attorney General. . . ." The absolute power of the Attorney General to
transfer upheld in Zerbst v. Kidwell, 92 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), and in Wite v.
Kwiatkowvski, 60 F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932), throws come doubt upon its cignificance.
In 1941, however, the statute was amended and the provision giving the courts power to
sentence to a type of institution was omitted. "Hereafter all persons convicted of an offenza
against the United States shall be committed,for such terms of imprisonment as the court may
direct, to the custody of the Attorney General.. . ..." 5 STAr. 743 (1941), 18 U. S. C.
§ 753(0 (Supp. 1944). See also H. R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d SZ3. (1930), 9190
(emphasis supplied).
27. The inmates received at federal camps, for instance, are selected on the basis of:
"(1) benefit ...to the inmate, (2) security risk presented by the inmate, and (3) physical
condition." Armstrong, Prison Camps for Rehabilitation (April-June 1942) 6 FEDERAL
PROBATiox 38, 39. Mr. Armstrong, supervisor of federal prison camps, Bureau of Prisong,
gives no hint that selection is based in any way upon the nature of the crime committed.
28. The Bureau of Prisons apparently classified persons serving more than one year as
felons, and others as misdemeanants. See ROBINSOV, o. cit. supra note 11.
The 1941 amendment to 46 STAT. 326 (1930) forbids any person sentenced "for an
offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or less" to be eant to a peniten-
tiary without his consent. 55 STAT. 743 (1941), 1 U. S. C. § 753(f) (Supp. 1944).
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adopted some definite chronological line probably provides the best criterion,
as it can be applied easily to all crimes, except where indeterminate sentences
are involved. It is possible that some such chronological considerations were
influential in the circuit court of appeals' decision that the one-year penalty
provided by the Sherman Act did not make its violation an infamous crime.
Whatever the rationale of the decision, it is unfortunate that it was not made
explicit.
